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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAT WHITE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
PAUL BLACKBURN, Bishop of 
the Taylorsville 43rd Ward of 
the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints; THE 
TAYLORSVILLE 43rd WARD OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, and THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, unincorp-
orated associations, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 88-0232 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
In and for Salt Lake County 
The Hon. John A. Rokich, Judge Presiding 
THE DEFENDANTS-REPONDENTS, by and through their counsel 
of record, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, and Allen M. Swan, 
respectfully submit the following BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS in the 
above captioned matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Respondents agree to the Statement of Issues set forth in 
the Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Defendants-Respondents agree there are no determinative 
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules and 
regulations. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff's Statement of Case set forth in her brief 
omits several essential facts which are undisputed and which 
more correctly set forth the circumstances out of which this 
litigation grew. Michael Chandler, 17 year old son of Plaintiff 
Pat White, made several approaches for Church assistance to 
Bishop Paul Blackburn, a newly called Bishop of the Taylorsville 
43rd Ward in Salt Lake County, Utah, stating that there were 
some problems at home in that his relationship) with his 
stepfather was not a good one and that he had been both verbally 
and physically abused by the stepfather and that his mother, 
Plaintiff herein, was agreeable to his getting out of the home 
environment. 
Bishop Blackburn insisted on permission from the mother 
before he would agree to giving Church aid for Chandler's 
returning to North Carolina where he had previously lived. The 
alleged purposes of of the trip were to finish high school in 
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that area and bring his brother, who had some problems with the 
law, back to Utah with him. He was told by Chandler not to 
contact the mother at home because this would result in some 
"hurt" to his mother or himself from the stepfather. 
After the mother failed to contact the Bishop and on 
receiving her telephone number at work, the Bishop attempted to 
contact her, but he asked for "Pat Chandler" and was told that 
there was no one at the store by that name. He made no further 
attempt to telephone the mother at work. Finally, after 
persistent requests by Chandler, Bishop Blackburn said he would 
give the requested financial assistance if Mrs. White either 
telephoned him or gave written permission. Thereafter he was 
given a note purportedly executed by the mother, but which, 
unbeknown to the Bishop, had been forged by Chandler, and which 
note gave the consent which the Bishop had made a condition of 
Church assistance. 
The Bishop's wife, Julie Blackburn, was party to a 
telephone conversation with a Mrs. Barney in the State of North 
Carolina and had verified that the boy would be welcome to stay 
with the Barneys and would be treated as one of their own family 
while he was completing his high school education in that 
state. This information was conveyed by Mrs. Blackburn to her 
husband prior to his writing a check to the airlines. 
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Upon discovering that her son had gone to North Carolina 
with Church assistance, Plaintiff had a telephone conversation 
with Bishop Blackburn as a result of which Plaintiff was 
offended because Bishop Blackburn told her that the Church would 
not seek reimbursement for the plane fare from the Whites. She 
felt that the Bishop was cold. Efforts to placate Plaintiff by 
Bishop Blackburn and President Luker, Stake President of the 
Taylorsville North Stake, were unsuccessful, Plaintiff having 
sought out an attorney and having been advised by counsel not to 
speak further with Church representatives. 
Plaintiff commenced this action against the bishop of the 
local Ward and the general Church alleging (1) intentional 
interference with the parent-child relationship; (2) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent infliction of 
emotional distress; (4) clerical malpractice; and (5) 
negligence. Defendants moved for Summary Judgment of Dismissal 
and Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
with respect to liability. The court granted Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment with respect to all causes of action and 
Mrs. White has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Blackburn who was 28 years of age at the time 
of the incident giving rise to this lawsuit (born June 20, 1957) 
received a BS Degree in Nursing at the University of Utah, 
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(Blackburn Deposition, p. 10) commenced working as a male nurse 
at the Eye Institute of Utah in December of 1983 (Blackburn 
Deposition, p. 15) and at the time of his deposition in May of 
1987 was the coordinator for FHP Redwood Out-Patient Surgery 
Center (Blackburn Deposition, p. 9). On the division of the 
17th Ward of the Taylorsville Stake, Blackburn was called as 
Bishop of the Taylorsville 43rd Ward in February of 1986. 
(Blackburn Deposition, P. 40) 
Prior to the incident which resulted in this lawsuit 
Blackburn did not know of the existence of Pat White or any of 
the other family members except for Mike Chandler, the 17 year 
old, who came to the Bishop's home in late April or early May 
1986 and talked to the Bishop in his living room. (Blackburn 
Deposition, p. 45) Chandler explained that his mother was 
having some medical problems and would probably need Church 
assistance in the future but that her immediate concern was that 
he get out of the environment of the home because there were 
some problems between him and his stepfather and that his 
stepfather had been abusive to him as well as his mother, both 
physically and verbally, and that he had a brother in North 
Carolina who had just gotten out of some kind of prison or 
juvenile hall and that he wanted to go back and bring the 
brother to Salt Lake and that he needed assistance to get there 
(Blackburn Deposition, p. 46). 
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In this initial conversation Blackburn responded that he 
was not prepared to help the young man without some kind of 
confirmation from his mother or his father that it was all right 
and that Chandler would have to have his mother contact him and 
give her permission, or if he didn't feel comfortable in doing 
that, the Bishop would be happy to call her and talk to her. 
Chandler told the Bishop that because of the situation at home 
if his father found out anything about what was going on from 
phone calls his father would "hurt" his mother or him. 
(Blackburn Deposition, pp. 47, 48). Bishop Blackburn further 
recalled that during the initial conversation Chandler mentioned 
something about finishing his schooling in North Carolina, that 
he had contacted some friends back there with whom he would be 
staying while he finished his schooling and that following his 
schooling he was prepared to enter the U.S. Army (Blackburn 
Deposition, pp. 49, 50). The Bishop asked Chandler his age and 
learned that "he would be 18 soon" and would be going into the 
Army. The Bishop said that he would have to have permission 
from Chandler's parents before he could proceed and asked 
Chandler to have his mother call him. Bishop Blackburn did not 
remember whether he received a work phone number as well as a 
home phone number at that time, but he informed Chandler that he 
needed to talk to his mother (Blackburn Deposition, pp. 50, 
51). Initially it was understood that Mrs. White would contact 
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the Bishop but that the Bishop was not to contact the mother 
because of "problems that would erupt at home" if he did 
(Blackburn Deposition, p. 51). 
The next contact occurred early one morning as Bishop 
Blackburn was preparing to leave for work (Blackburn Deposition, 
p. 52), a Friday of the same week in which the initial contact 
had been made. No effort had been made by Bishop Blackburn to 
contact the mother because of the understanding that the mother 
would contact him (Blackburn Deposition, p. 52). Blackburn 
reiterated to Chandler that he could not act until he had 
confirmation from Chandler's mother that it was all right to 
proceed which upset Chandler because he wanted to leave on the 
bus that afternoon (Blackburn Deposition, p. 53). 
On the ensuing Saturday night Blackburn had further 
contact with Chandler at which time Chandler informed the Bishop 
that he had checked into airline reservations and informed the 
Bishop how much the trip would cost (Blackburn Deposition, p. 
54). Blackburn reiterated that he could do nothing "without 
confirmation from his mother one way or another whether this 
could take place" (Blackburn Deposition, p. 54). On the 
Saturday afternoon Blackburn learned from his wife, Julie, that 
Chandler had been to the house and that Mrs. Blackburn had 
talked to the people with whom Chandler was going to be staying 
in North Carolina and had gotten confirmation from them that it 
-7-
was all right for him to stay there (Blackburn Deposition, p. 
56). Mrs. Blackburn had taken the phone number of the people in 
North Carolina and she told her husband that he was welcome to 
call them if he needed to do so (Blackburn Deposition, p. 56). 
Mrs. Blackburn was assured in the telephone conversation with 
the Barneys that Michael would be welcome to stay with them and 
that "he's just like our own son". (Julie Blackburn Deposition, 
p. 18). Chandler further informed Mrs. Barney in Mrs. 
Blackburn's presence when and where he would be arriving (Julie 
Blackburn Deposition, p. 14). 
On the Saturday evening when Chandler again contacted the 
Bishop, he said something to him about the fact that his mother 
was at home and she couldn't call the Bishop at which time 
Bishop Blackburn suggested that if he couldn't call the mother 
and she couldn't call him that he would accept a note signed by 
her giving him permission to allow Chandler to make his trip 
(Blackburn Deposition, p. 57). Bishop Blackburn had previously 
tried to telephone Mike's mother at work because he had a work 
number for Dan's (Foodtown) but when he called the number and 
asked for "Pat" they said, "Pat who?", and the Bishop responded, 
"Pat Chandler" and the store reported, "We don't have anybody 
here by that name", and that was as far as the Bishop pursued 
the conversation (Blackburn Deposition, p. 60). 
-8-
On Sunday morning Chandler arrived at the Church and met 
Blackburn in the Bishop1s Office before 7:00 a.m. at which time 
Chandler produced the note which gave permission from the mother 
for the North Carolina trip (Blackburn Deposition, p. 64). 
Blackburn read the note which stated that there were some 
problems at home with the relationship with the father and some 
medical expenses that the mother was anticipating would prevent 
her from helping her son go to North Carolina and "would I 
please help him with this". The note further stated that the 
mother would appreciate having assistance with medical problems 
in the near future and that "I was welcome to come and visit her 
at any time, or something along that line". Blackburn threw the 
note away sometime after Chandler left and it wasn't until he 
returned home that night and talked to Mrs. White on the 
telephone that he had "any worries about it" (Blackburn 
Deposition, p. 65). In this action it is admitted that the note 
had been prepared and the signature of Mrs. White forged by 
Chandler (See Chandler Affidavit, R. 180, If 29). Chandler was 
assisted to the airport by Jorge Becerra, Priest Quorum Advisor 
in Chandler's former Ward (Taylorsville 17th). Becerra had 
inquired of Chandler while he was driving him to the airport 
where he got the money for the plane ticket and Chandler showed 
Becerra the check from Bishop Blackburn (Chandler Affidavit, 
R. 181, 1T 36) . 
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Chandler upon arriving in North Carolina stayed with the 
Barneys for a week and then with a family named Fenton but there 
was some trouble about staying there, resulting in Chandler 
staying a couple of nights out of doors. He never enrolled in 
high school in North Carolina (Chandler Affidavit, p. 182, 
IT 39). 
Bishop Blackburn had had no training, either as a father 
or in the capacity as an Elder's Quorum President (in which 
capacity Bishop Blackburn had previously served), which would 
"aid in deciphering whether or not a teenage kid like Mike 
Chandler was lying" (Blackburn Deposition, p. 72). His 
inservice training as a bishop provided no instruction with 
respect to making judgments as to whether one of his 
congregation was telling him the truth or lying and that in such 
instances he relied upon what evidence was before him and his 
own judgment tempered by the inspiration to which he believed he 
was entitled as a Bishop. (Blackburn Affidavit rec, p. 24). 
Within two days William Luker, President of the 
Taylorsville North Central Stake, received a letter from Mrs. 
White complaining of the incident. Bishop Blackburn attempted 
to contact Mrs. White and tell her he had acted in good faith 
but could not reach her at home. Knowing now that her full name 
was "Pat White" he called the grocery store where she worked. 
Mrs. White told Bishop Blackburn that the people in North 
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Carolina could not register Mike without a guardianship and that 
she had turned Michael in as a "run-away". She further stated 
that she had learned that the Whites would have to pay for 
Michael's way home, at which time Bishop Blackburn offered to 
pay the fare of Michael back to Utah, but Mrs. White responded, 
"No, we'll let him sit there and learn a lesson" (Blackburn 
Affidavit, R. 27, 1f 12). Bishop Blackburn further offered to 
assist in paying amounts which Michael had borrowed from others, 
but Mrs. White stated, "That is not necessary, we will let Mike 
take care of them" (Blackburn Affidavit, R. 27, If 12). 
Michael Chandler returned to Utah June 14, 1986, and 
special arrangements were made for his high school graduation 
which were successful (Pat White Affidavit R. 80, H 19). He 
was delayed in entering the U.S. Army approximately one month 
(Chandler Affidavit, R. 182, If 40). 
In her Affidavit, Plaintiff states that as a result of 
Bishop Blackburn "helping" her son run away from home she 
suffered terrible mental distress and emotional upheaval and 
that her family and she were greatly disrupted for more than a 
month while Michael was in North Carolina; that for a period of 
several days after Mike left she did not know where he was and 
was concerned for his safety and well being (Pat White 
Affidavit, R. 80, 11 19). Mrs. White suffered no out-of-pocket 
expenses in connection with the incident, the Church unit in 
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North Carolina having paid for Michael's transportation back to 
Utah and there having been no tutoring costs, no loss of income 
to the family as a result of Michael's absence, no money sent to 
families in North Carolina who hosted Michael, and no medical 
bills paid as a result of the incident (Pat White Deposition, 
pp. 88-92), and although Mrs. White personally reimbursed a 
friend of Michael's in the sum of $240.00 for money that Michael 
had borrowed, Mrs. White was not asking the Church to reimburse 
her for that sum (Pat White Deposition, p. 88). 
Plaintiff knew as early as the Sunday afternoon when her 
son left Salt Lake City, because she telephoned Mrs. Barney, 
that the Barneys were expecting Michael and that Mrs. Blackburn, 
the Bishop's wife, had asked if it was okay for Michael to come 
and stay with them. She was told that "Mike is always welcome 
in our home, he is like part of the family". At that time 
Michael had not actually arrived but the Barneys were expecting 
him. Mrs. White told Mrs. Barney that she did not give her 
permission for the trip and that she didn't know what to do and 
that Mrs. Barney should call her if "she heard anything" (Pat 
White Deposition, p. 49). 
Later in the week Plaintiff again called Mrs. Barney and 
learned that Michael had arrived but that he stayed with them 
only one day, took off, and that he said that he was going to 
see his brother who was with the Fentons (Pat White, Deposition, 
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p. 50). Although Mrs. White apparently attempted to contact the 
Fentons there was a lapse of approximately one week before she 
got them. When finally contacted, the Fentons confirmed that 
Michael was with them. During that week Mrs. White "assumed he 
was with the Fentons" (Pat White Deposition, p. 51). Mrs. 
White further testified that she had assumed during the entire 
period that Michael was either with the Barneys or the Fentons 
and "figured since nobody was calling and saying Michael is hurt 
that at least he was safe" (Pat White Deposition, p. 52). 
Michael ended up not going to school because he needed to 
have special permission executed before a notary public and by 
the time Mrs. White was able to get this to Pine Forest High in 
North Carolina "it was too late" (Pat White Deposition, p. 43). 
Mrs. White further testified that she did not have the Fentons 
put Michael back on a plane to Salt Lake City because "I 
couldn't ask them to pay for him to come back to Salt Lake City 
and I didn't have the money and Brenda Ross at the Police 
Department said to just let him stay there seeing as he was 
going to be 18 in July" (Pat White Deposition, p. 53). Further 
explaining this advice, Mrs. White testified, "Brenda Ross of 
the West Valley Police Department told me that the only way he 
could get back, she would turn him in as a run-away but I would 
have to pay for it and I didn't have it". Further, "I didn't 
turn him in, I only discussed it with her. She told me that 
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being as Michael was going to be 18 in July, if he was okay 
where he was at, just to let him stay." When asked if Fentons 
were willing that Michael stay on with them, Mrs. White 
testified that they were willing. (Pat White Deposition p. 54, 
55). According to Mrs. White, Michael graduated from 
Taylorsville High, received a diploma from that school, and was 
able to do so with no special classes (Pat White Deposition, p. 
55, 56). 
Mrs. White testified that she had not talked to Michael 
for a period of approximately eight days after he left Salt Lake 
City (Pat White Deposition, p. 56); that she learned of the 
forged note from her son Frank after Michael left (Pat White 
Deposition, p. 58) and also from the Fentons when Michael had 
apparently admitted to them the preparation of the note (Pat 
White Deposition, p. 59). Mrs. White, in discussing her case 
with her attorney, didn't remember whether she had brought up 
the fact of the forgery or not. When asked on her deposition 
whether she had any doubt that there was a forged note she 
responded, "No sir, I have not questioned that." (Pat White 
Deposition, p. 60). 
Mrs. White further confirmed that Bishop Blackburn said 
he had not called her at home because of the statement by Mike 
that this would cause some harm to his mother if his stepfather 
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knew. She testified of the conversation with Bishop Blackburn 
on the Sunday night of Mike's leaving as follows: 
The night that Bishop Blackburn finally called, and it 
took some doing before he finally called, at 7:00 that 
night, and my first words were, !Did you give my son 
money to go to North Carolina?1, and he said, fYes, I 
did.1 And I said, !Why?f and he said, 'Because your son 
said his life was in danger and he also had a note signed 
by you for him to go1, and I said, 'I did not write any 
note', and he said, 'I realize that now', and I said, 
'Why didn't you contact me if you were concerned, by 
phone?' and he said, 'Because Michael also said that your 
life was in danger", and I said, 'That is not true. In 
that case, if you believed him why didn't you call the 
proper authorities, if you believed my life was in 
danger, why didn't you call the proper authorities and 
have them check the story out?' He did not reply. The 
next sentence to come out of his mouth was 'You don't 
have to worry about paying me back or the Church for the 
plane fare to North Carolina' 
I was so stunned at that remark because he was so cold 
during that whole conversation. I mean, if he would have 
been more caring. He was almost cold. You know, like 
when you talk to somebody and you almost get chills. 
(Pat White Deposition, pp. 62, 63). 
Although Bishop Blackburn and President Luker came to the 
White home Mrs. White testified that because she had retained an 
attorney there was some question as to whether she should even 
talk to them (Pat White Deposition, p. 71). When questioned as 
to whether she eventually ended up talking to either of them she 
testified: 
I went up and I heard Blackburn tell my husband when my 
husband said that she doesn't want to talk to you, 
Blackburn said that he wanted to hear it from her. I got 
up from the couch and I went over and President Luker 
introduced hisself to me and then he turned to Bishop 
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Blackburn and he said fWe would like to talk to you, if 
possible.f 
I said, 'Well, I would like to talk to you, but only in 
the presence of my attorney. If you would like to set up 
an appointment I would be more than happy to do that.f 
The whole time Blackburn hadn't said anything to me and 
only after that he said to me, fIs Michael all right?1, 
and I said, fSure he is.1 And he said, 'Will you have 
him call me?' And I said, 'Yes, I will.' Which I did 
and I told Michael that Blackburn wanted him to call him. 
(Pat White Deposition, p. 71, 72) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Church Defendants have never taken the position that 
the doctrine of respondeat superior was inapplicable in this 
case. If Bishop Blackburn is liable on any of the theories 
proposed by Plaintiff then it is conceded that the Bishop acted 
within the scope of his authority. 
Defendants contend, however, that the Plaintiff cannot 
recover as a matter of law on any of her theories of liability. 
Defendants maintain that there is no genuine issue with respect 
to simple negligence, since even if such were found, there is no 
genuine issue as to recoverable damages, Plaintiff having 
conceded that the only damages she allegedly suffered consisted 
of emotional distress. 
The causes of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and clerical malpractice cannot succeed 
because this court has determined that only in certain 
circumstances may a Plaintiff recover for emotional distress in 
-16-
a simple negligence action and the conduct of the Defendants do 
not meet the case law criteria nor does Bishop Blackburn's 
conduct amount to "clerical malpractice" even if such a doctrine 
exists within the State of Utah, which it does not. 
Further, the theories of intentional interference with 
parent-child relationship, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and "negligence per se" fail on the facts since the 
Bishop's conduct did not rise to the level necessary to fit any 
of these theories. The Bishop's conduct did not consist of the 
intentional doing of an act which he could reasonably foresee 
would cause harm. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS CONCEDE THAT IF LIABILITY WERE PRESENT 
THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR WOULD APPLY 
The Defendants have never resisted liability on the basis 
of the inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
The Church entities concede that Bishop Blackburn was acting 
within the scope of his authority in the conduct of which 
Plaintiff complains. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THIS CASE 
The Defendants contend that even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiff White there are no genuine issues of 
fact which would require a trial. Assuming that Plaintiff's 
case consists of the testimony in the depositions and affidavits 
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of Plaintiff, her son, Michael, and the uncontroverted testimony 
of Bishop Blackburn, his wife, and Jorge Becerra, this would be 
a proper case for a directed verdict of nonsuit. As stated in 
Pakos v. Clark, 453 P.2d 682, (Ore., 1969) 
If the minds of reasonable men would not 
differ on the factual issues then the court 
is obligated to grant an order of involun-
tary nonsuit. 
Likewise, the same evidence, when made the basis for a 
motion for summary judgment of dismissal, should result in a 
granting of that motion. The trial court correctly found that 
reasonable minds could not differ as to whether the defendants1 
conduct entitled plaintiff to recover under her various theories. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH 
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP FAILS ON THE FACTS 
The First Cause of Action alleges intentional 
interference with parent-child relationship specifying that the 
actions of Bishop Blackburn were "unjustifiable in that the 
Defendant Blackburn had no authority or legitimate reason for 
transporting the child to North Carolina". The affidavits and 
depositions establish beyond question that Bishop Blackburn was 
acting in good faith and reasonably under the circumstances 
since, after trying to contact Michael's mother (which efforts 
were restricted by Michael's instructing the Bishop not to call 
his mother at home), he requested a permission note which on its 
face was signed by the mother, which later turned out to be a 
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forgery. No facts have been presented which would have put 
Bishop Blackburn on notice that Michael was duping him with a 
forged note. 
The case of Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980) 
discusses the import of the word "intentional". In that case a 
junior high school student had thrown a "tootsie-pop" (all-day 
sucker) at a maintenance man from the second floor of the junior 
high school inflicting physical damage. The issue was whether 
the act constituted an intentional assault and battery for which 
the statute of limitations was one year, or could be viewed as 
being reckless misconduct or reckless disregard for the safety 
of others (negligence), which would extend the statute of 
limitations to four years. In the District Court a summary 
judgment of dismissal had been granted, the court declaring that 
the act constituted an assault and battery and was, therefore/ 
governed by the one year statute of limitations. This court 
reversed, holding that the act could constitute reckless 
misconduct or reckless disregard for the safety of others. The 
Court quoted Restatement of Torts § 500 Comment (f): 
Reckless misconduct differs from intentional 
wrongdoing in a very important particular. 
While an act to be reckless must be intended 
by the actor, he does not intend to cause 
the harm which results from it. It is 
enough that he realizes, or from facts which 
he knows, should realize that there is a 
strong probability that harm may result, 
even though he hopes or even expects that 
his conduct will prove harmless. However, a 
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strong probability is a different thing from 
a substantial certainty without which he 
cannot be said to intend the harm in which 
his act results. 
From the above it appears that for a person to intend the 
harm in which his act results there must be a "substantial 
certainty" that such conduct will, indeed, cause harm. In this 
case there was no "substantial certainty" that harm would result 
from assisting Michael to fly to North Carolina. In fact, the 
evidence discloses that no harm did result. Michael graduated 
from high school and entered the service as planned, the delay 
of a few weeks was inconsequential and since Bishop Blackburn 
assumed that Mrs. White had agreed to the temporary separation 
when he was presented with the forged note, there was nothing to 
indicate a substantial certainty of harm in the temporary 
separation. Neither purpose expressed to the Bishop, whether it 
be that Michael was going to North Carolina to get his older 
brother and bring him to Utah or that he was going to North 
Carolina to finish high school where he would be free from the 
oppressive conduct of his stepfather, created a "substantial 
certainty of harm". 
The case of Lloyd v. Loefler, 518 F.Supp. 720 (Wis. 1981) 
is cited by Plaintiff. In that case a summary judgment was 
denied where grandparents were sued for the intentional 
interference with a parent-child relationship and where the 
facts indicated that the grandparents had conspired with their 
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daughter and new son-in-law in violating a custody order to the 
injury of the natural father. Five separate acts of misconduct 
were specified all of which required a full knowledge of the 
facts and indicated an intention of the grandparents to 
interfere with the parent-child relationship. The distinction 
between that case and ours is that Bishop Blackburn was not 
given the facts. The fact of the mother's unwillingness to let 
the boy go to North Carolina was kept from him by the deceit of 
Michael Chandler. The defendants in Loefler knew their conduct 
would interfere with plaintiff's parent-child relationship 
whereas Bishop Blackburn had no such knowledge. 
IV. THE FACTS ADDUCED BY PLAINTIFF FALL FAR SHORT OF THOSE 
REQUIRED FOR THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The case of Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 
P.2d 577 (Ore. Ct. App. 1983) involved an alleged intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and the Oregon Court observed: 
Although it is ordinarily for the trier of 
fact to determine not only the historical 
facts, but also whether the offensiveness of 
the defendant's conduct may reasonably be 
regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to 
permit recovery, if the minds of reasonable 
men would not differ on the subject the 
court is obliged to grant an order of 
involuntary nonsuit. 
The facts of that case were that a "convert" to 
Scientology, after withdrawing from the same, sought to recover 
damages for severe emotional distress alleging that she had been 
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deprived of freedom to voluntarily act. The court treated three 
elements said to be required, to wit; (1) intent, (2) conduct 
which is outrageous or beyond the limits of social toleration, 
and (3) resultant severe emotional distress. It observed in its 
decision that throughout the period of time the plaintiff had 
been involved with Scientology she had held a job, visited her 
parents, and had many contacts with non-Scientologists. The 
court dismissed the action and stated: 
Whether viewed as individual acts or taken 
together as a scheme we find nothing in this 
record which constitutes conduct which is 
beyond the limits of social toleration. 
There is no evidence that plaintiff was 
threatened or forced to remain involved in 
Scientology. 
The Oregon Court treats the same basic elements which the 
court must find to exist in the present fact situation to 
justify recovery on the basis of "intentional infliction of 
emotional distress". Bishop Blackburn, in providing 
transportation funds for Michael Chandler to fly to North 
Carolina, believing that he had received an authentic written 
permission note from Michael's natural mother, cannot reasonably 
be said to have the intent to inflict emotional distress. 
The Utah case of Sams v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 
1961), involved facts wherein the plaintiff claimed she had been 
subjected to severe emotional distress by the persistent, 
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indecent and immoral proposals of the defendant that she have 
sexual intercourse with him. This court stated: 
Our studies of the authorities and of the 
arguments advanced, convinces us that 
conceding such a cause of action may not be 
based on mere negligence, but the best 
considered view recognizes an action for 
severe emotional distress though not 
accompanied by bodily impact or physical 
injury where the defendant intentionally 
engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff 
(a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional 
distress, or (b) where any reasonable person 
would have known that such would result; and 
his actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in 
that they offend against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. 
It is submitted that the facts of the instant case do not 
even approach the requirements for an action for severe 
emotional distress as set forth in that case. 
This cause of action requires an intent to do an act 
which the actor knows, or should know, will reasonably result in 
harm. In this regard the case of Matheson v. Pearson cited in 
connection with the previously numbered argument is apropos and 
as a matter of law the conduct cannot be considered 
intentional. Nor, was the Bishop's conduct "outrageous" or 
"beyond the limits of social toleration". Further, his conduct 
did not result in "severe emotional distress" as evidenced by 
Mrs. White's deposition testimony wherein she conceded that she 
assumed because Michael was with friends or his brother that he 
was safe. 
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Restatement of Torts 2d § 46 (1965) states the following 
with respect to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress: 
It has not been enough that the defendant 
has acted with an intention which is 
tortious or even criminal or that he 
intended to inflict emotional distress or 
even that his conduct has been characterized 
by 'malice1 or a degree of aggravation which 
would entitle the plaintiff to punitive 
damages for another tort. Liability has 
been found only where the conduct has been 
so outrageous in character and so extrcsme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds 
of decency and to be regarded as atrocious 
and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. Generally, the case is one in 
which the recitation of the facts to an 
average member of the community would arouse 
his resentment against the actor and lead 
him to exclaim 'outrageous1. 
The Oregon court in Christofferson v. Church of 
Scientology, op. cit., modified the language of the Restatement 
as follows: 
We need a simpler test, and think it best 
for this case to merely hold that the 
conduct must be outrageous in the extreme. 
It is our impression that the test for 
liability in these cases can only be worked 
out on a case-by-case basis. Here we must 
determine whether defendant's conduct was so 
extreme as to warrant the imposition of 
liability for any severe emotional distress 
caused thereby. 
As previously noted, the Oregon court entered a nonsuit against 
the plaintiff. 
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In Lewis v. The Holy Spirit Assn. 589 F.Supp. 10 (Dist. 
Mass. 1983) plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant 
church of Reverend Moon engaged in "brain washing and 
indoctrination". The action was dismissed on defendant's 
motion, the court stating: 
Even if intended as the 'recognized tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional 
distress' in order to prove same the 
plaintiff would be required to show that 
defendant knew or should have known that 
distress would result to the plaintiff from 
its conducts; that the conduct was extreme 
and outrageous beyond all possible bounds of 
decency; that the defendant's acts caused 
plaintiff's distress, and that no reasonable 
person would be expected to endure such 
conduct. 
The federal court determined that the plaintiff had failed to 
allege such facts as would give rise to such cause of action. 
Plaintiff cites McBride v. Magnuson, 578 P.2d 1259 (Ore. 
1978) as authority. In the McBride case a mother was deprived 
of the custody of an eight month old child where a police 
officer was alleged to have maliciously and without probable 
cause, caused the child to be placed in protective custody. A 
trial court had granted a demurrer on the grounds that the 
police officer was immune from suit. The appellate court 
reversed holding that the case should go to trial. The 
distinction between that case and the instant one is obvious. 
Bishop Blackburn did not act "maliciously" or "without probable 
cause". His position was consistent in that he would not give 
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Michael transportation money without the consent of the mother 
which he believed he had finally obtained. Further, there is a 
considerable distinction in depriving a mother of an eight month 
old child and a few weeks separation of a mother from her 
seventeen year old son. 
Another case cited by Plaintiffs is that of State v. 
Tritt, P.O., 463 P.2d 806 (Utah 1970). In that case the 
defendant had provided a minor with prescriptions allowing him 
access to an excessive quantity of amphetamines and barbiturates 
and had made no efforts to determine whether the minor was a 
juvenile which provided the basis for a finding that the 
defendant was guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor as against defendantfs contention that there was no 
showing of necessary criminal intent. It is submitted that this 
case is easily distinguished in that the providing of an 
excessive amount of drugs to a minor would almost certainly 
cause harm while the furnishing of expense money to a 17 year 
old to make a flight to North Carolina with the purported 
consent of the mother suggests no probable harm. 
Another case cited by Plaintiff is Grimsby v. Sampson, 
530 P.2d 291 (Wash. 1975) where a doctor and hospital were sued, 
the complaint alleging that the physician recklessly and 
wantonly ignored the Plaintiff's wife and allowed her to "die 
right in front of his eyes". The court found in Grimsby that 
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the issue before it was whether it can be said that "there was 
no state of facts which Plaintiff could prove entitling him to 
relief under his claim". The court found that there might exist 
under the alleged facts sufficient evidence to proceed to trial 
based upon the following requirements: 
(1) emotional distress must be intentional 
or recklessly inflicted, (2) the conduct of 
the defendant must be outrageous and 
extreme, (3) there must exist severe 
emotional distress, (4) plaintiff must be an 
immediate family member and be present at 
the time of such conduct. 
It is submitted that none of the those elements exist in the 
instant case. 
V. DEFENDANTS1 CONDUCT DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR A 
FINDING OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
In the recent case of Johnson v. Rogers and Newspaper 
Agency Corporation, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (1988) this court made 
some modification of the law respecting the tort of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. The court departed from the 
previously recognized law to the effect "it is well established 
in Utah that a cause of action for emotional distress may not be 
based upon mere negligence". See Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 
(Utah 1982). The Court observed: 
Virtually all jurisdictions in the United 
States now recognize a broad protected 
interest in mental tranquility first 
acknowledged in Utah in Jeppsen v. Jensen, 
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47 Utah at 543, (155 P. at 431). The 
negligent infliction of emotional distress 
as a separate tort (distinct from the 
'willful and wanton' infliction of emotional 
distress or the negligent infliction of 
physical injuries with concomitant emotional 
injuries) has evolved rapidly only since the 
1960's (citing authorities). A common fact 
pattern for the cause of action is that 
existing in this case: a bystander observes 
negligent injury to a victim which causes 
the bystander to suffer emotional distress. 
The courts have developed several rules 
affecting recovery for the emotional 
distress. Currently, no jurisdiction 
precludes recovery under any circumstances. 
Recovery is based upon the satisfaction of 
one of three standards: the impact rule, 
the zone-of-danger rule, or a foreseeability 
standard. 
A discussion of the rule of law to be 
applied must be general because the facts of 
this case would satisfy any of the three 
major tests applied in other jurisdictions. 
The Plaintiff here suffered an impact during 
the accident, receiving physical injuries to 
his foot. Furthermore, he was in the 
immediate zone of danger created by Rogers' 
acts. Finally, all three of the Dillon 
criteria are present: he was located 
immediately at the scene of the accident, he 
saw and heard all of the events associated 
with the violence to the victim, and that 
victim was his child. 
The writer goes on to state: 
I would hold that one may recover for the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress 
when one was in the zone of danger created 
by the negligence and suffered a physical 
impact. I, nevertheless, express the view 
that the less arbitrary, more traditional 
tort analysis embodied in the Dillon rule 
(forseeability) is appropriate. It is true 
that Dillon is more flexible than the impact 
and zone of danger rules but it is not 
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entirely free from the criticism that it, 
too, has become hardened and mechanical in 
practice because the courts in attempting to 
apply it have no general policies to guide 
them in the difficult cases. If there is a 
rule which can determine liability in a more 
policy-oriented and less arbitrary manner 
while still drawing a line short of 
unlimited liability, such a rule should be 
adopted. A clear rule needs a clear 
rationale. 
The concurring opinion in Johnson v. Rogers, supra, 
(joined in by three other Justices, thus constituting a 
majority) observes that the writer of the main opinion, while 
surveying the law of other states, declines to choose from among 
the various possible rules because "all seem satisfied in this 
case". The concurring opinion goes on to state: 
We cannot permit every claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress to go to a 
jury under such varying standards as each 
trial judge may choose. We have a practical 
obligation to articulate understandable 
standards and to impose workable limits for 
use in the Utah courts. In the exercise of 
that function, I think it best to adopt as 
the test for determining liability for the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress 
the standards set forth in Section 313 of 
the Restatement (2d) of Torts (1965) as 
explained in the comments accompanying that 
section. 
The section from the Restatement of Torts referred to 
requires: 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes 
emotional distress to another, he is subject 
to liability to the other for resulting 
illness or bodily harm if the actor 
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(a) should have realized that his 
conduct involved an unreasonable risk of 
causing the distress, otherwise than by 
knowledge of the harm or peril of a third 
person, and 
(b) from facts known to him, should 
have realized that the distress, if it were 
caused, might result in illness or bodily 
harm. 
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) has no 
application to illness or bodily harm of 
another which is caused by emotional 
distress arising solely from harm or peril 
to a third person, unless the negligence of 
the actor has otherwise created an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the 
other. 
The conduct of Bishop Blackburn does not meet the 
criteria set forth in the Restatement and favored by a majority 
of this court. 
VI. NO ACTION FOR CLERICAL MALPRACTICE IS RECOGNIZED IN 
THIS STATE 
Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth a theory denominated 
"clerical malpractice". Defendants contend that no such cause 
of action exists within the State of Utah. The leading case 
cited by Plaintiff in her brief is that of Nally v. Grace 
Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. App. 
1984), which case is pending on appeal before the California 
Supreme Court. That case involved the alleged misconduct of a 
pastor of a protestant church in failing to refer a young man 
who exhibited suicidal tendencies for counseling by a therapist 
"authorized and specially suited to prevent suicide". The 
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District Court had entered nonsuit against the plaintiff but the 
Court of Appeals held that the evidence that the church's 
counselors breached their duty as "non-therapist counselors" was 
sufficient to overcome a nonsuit motion. The key as to whether 
Nally II really supports an action for "clerical or clergy 
malpractice" is found in the very first paragraph of the opinion 
of the California Court of Appeals. That paragraph reads: 
This is the second time around in the 
appellate courts for this case. The first 
opinion generated a veritable fire storm of 
controversy in the nation's law reviewers. 
They called it the 'seminal1 case in a new 
cause of action most frequently labeled 
'clergy malpractice'. This court, however, 
does not view the causes of action discussed 
in our opinion to involve 'clergy 
malpractice'. Instead we see them more 
accurately characterized as 'negligent 
failure to prevent suicide' and 'intentional 
or reckless infliction of emotional injury 
causing suicide'--which negligent and 
intentional or reckless acts happen to have 
been committed by church-affiliated 
counselors. In our view this case has 
little or nothing to say about the liability 
of clergymen for the negligent performance 
of their ordinary ministerial duties or even 
their counseling duties except when they 
enter into a counseling relationship with 
suicidal individuals. 
Obviously the instant case does not involve the 
counseling of suicidal individuals, and thus Nally II is 
inapropos if intended to support a new cause of action for 
clergy malpractice. 
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Plaintiff in her brief argues that Nally II is authority 
for the proposition that a reasonable clergyman, such as Bishop 
Blackburn, would have referred the "family and/or Mike to 
professionals trained to solve the difficulty". (Plaintiff's 
Brief, p. 30) rather than assist the boy to remove to another 
place. Plaintiff cites the decision in Nally II, requesting 
this court to "remove the word "suicidal" from the "principle of 
law which found a duty on the pastor as enunciated in that 
case." Defendants contend that such a proposal is stretching 
Nally II far beyond its intent. Plaintiff recognizes the First 
Amendment difficulties in a civil court restricting or 
circumscribing pastoral counseling. Her brief on this appeal 
states at page 31: 
No First Amendment difficulties are 
presented by White's allegation because the 
Court will not be inhibiting or directing 
Bishop Blackburn's ecclesiastical 
performance and counseling. He is, and 
necessarily should be, free to continue to 
counsel Chandler and other church members 
spiritually. 
But the argued for "duty to refer" which Plaintiff 
maintains Nally II establishes, when applied to the instant case 
does amount to a proscription of Bishop Blackburn's exercise of 
his judgment as a spiritual leader in determining whether there 
was sufficient evidence to indicate a serious problem in the 
White home, particularly involving Michael Chandler and his 
stepfather, and whether that problem might be resolved (with the 
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consent of the mother) by assisting Michael in finishing his 
high school education in another state. It seems that the same 
First Amendment arguments which have been raised by the authors 
of various law review articles pertain to the instant fact 
situation and that a civil court should not interfere with 
Bishop Blackburn's judgment as to whether (1) Michael was 
telling him the truth, (2) it would be of benefit to Michael and 
his mother that the church assist Michael in removing to another 
state to complete his education, and (3) the consent requested 
by Bishop Blackburn as a condition to Church assistance was 
sufficient. None of these judgments dictate a referral to a 
professional. 
Nally II and other trial court actions filed in Florida, 
Ohio and Washington led to a treatment of the theory of "clergy 
malpractice" in two excellent law review articles. See Comment, 
"Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the 
Clergy Malpractice Concept." 19 Cal. W. Law Rev. 507; also 
Article, "Clergyman Malpractice, Ramifications of a New Theory", 
16 Valpariso University Law Rev., 163 (1981). 
The foregoing law review articles point out that in order 
for there to be a finding of negligence on the part of the 
cleric there must be, among other things, a duty owing the 
plaintiff by the defendant. Even if there were a duty, it is a 
moral duty and not a legal duty and a breach thereof would have 
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no legal consequences. Moral obligations, if they are breached, 
are not enforceable. As stated in the California Western Law 
Review comment: 
To the extent a pastor's duty is derived 
from his religious ministry, it is not the 
proper function of the court to judge the 
cleric's conduct of his mission. 
Sometimes the existence of a duty can be determined from 
applicable statutes. Our Utah Legislature has not seen fit to 
put any restrictions on religious counseling nor is it likely 
that the Legislature would adopt such restrictions in view of 
the strong constitutional pronouncements guaranteeing freedom of 
worship. 
The principal difficulty with the clergy malpractice 
concept is that the plaintiff asks the court to determine that 
the defendant has failed to conform to a judicially established 
standard of care which would regulate religious counseling. 
Proponents of the theory have argued that the court should adopt 
the standards of the psychotherapy professions for measuring 
clergyman conduct. The plaintiff apparently perceives the 
function of religious and psychological counseling as similar. 
The commentator in the California Western Law Review article 
points out the valid distinction as follows: 
When the peculiar conduct involved in 
pastoral counseling is so defined 
(interaction with the holy spirit) and 
understood, it is readily apparent that 
reference to scientifically or medically 
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based forms of counseling to develop a 
standard of care is inapt. 
In religious teaching and counseling one communicates 
religious beliefs and insights to assist the listener with 
day-to-day problems. One cannot separate the counseling or 
teaching from its philosophical basis. Regulation of religious 
activity is particularly suspect if that regulation involves any 
evaluation of underlying religious beliefs, United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) and regulation of religious 
communication is constitutionally forbidden. See Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West.Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Any attempt at 
regulating religious teaching and counseling by requiring a 
religious practitioner to conform to a judicially established 
standard of care would violate the constitutional freedoms of 
speech and religion. Hence clerical malpractice has not been 
generally recognized as a legal cause of action. 
The concluding paragraph of the California Western Law 
Review article previously cited is as follows: 
It seems highly probable a civil court's 
enforcement of a standard of care of 
pastoral counseling will harm the 
constitutional rights of the clergy and the 
counselees by abridging their freedom under 
the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. It seems equally probable that 
such regulation would violate the 
constitutional mandate of Church-State 
separation and present the courts with 
serious questions of public Policy. The 
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considerations substantially outweigh 
whatever possible benefit an individual may 
obtain in such a suit. Accordingly, the 
defense as proposed in this comment, based 
on constitutional premises and public policy 
should be recognized as applicable in future 
malpractice litigation. 
Likewise, the Valpariso article concludes as follows: 
The law of torts has been the battleground 
for social theory. Each new theory raises 
far more questions than answers and the 
theory of clergyman malpractice is no 
exception. Since clergyman malpractice 
inevitably deals with doctrinal, 
ecclesiastical, and spiritual issues, 
judicial review will force the courts into 
dangerous territory. Thus, with the 
possible exception of the instance where 
'actual malice1 on the part of the counselor 
is alleged to exist, it seems clear that the 
First Amendment will bar the introduction of 
this theory into the legal arena. 
The District Court in his Memorandum Decision, R. 207, II 
4 states: 
Even if there were an action recognized in 
Utah for clerical malpractice, the acts of 
defendant would not raise to that level. In 
this particular case you do not have 
defendant Blackburn attempting to advise Mr. 
Chandler in matters that should have been 
referred to a professional such as a 
psychiatrist, psychologist, or a physician, 
or even a spiritual leader. 
The court believes that to impose legal 
standards upon the religious teachings of 
the various denominations would undermine 
the religions of the world and violate the 
constitutional freedoms of speech and 
religion. 
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The District Court likened the issue of "clerical 
malpractice" to that of loss of consortium as discussed in Greg 
Hackford and Sherri Hackford v. Utah Power & Light, 59 Utah Adv. 
Rpts. 21, observing that: 
The Court, in its opinion (in Hackford) 
indicates that if causes of action such as 
argued by the plaintiff are to be created 
anew in Utah, it should be done by the 
legislature. 
To illustrate that imposing liability upon a pastoral 
counselor for "negligent failure to refer" substantially burdens 
the exercise of religion, these defendants propose that at least 
six distinct burdens would affect the exercise of religion by 
individual pastors, by the institutions they serve and by the 
people they counsel. 
First, and perhaps most important the "duty effectively 
to refer" suggested by the plaintiff would seriously undermine 
the confidentiality of the counseling relationship between a 
pastor and any individual who is severely depressed or who has, 
as in Nally II, suicidal tendencies. Confidentiality is an 
essential ingredient of the trust that must exist in a 
successful counseling relationship in the Mormon Church, as 
elsewhere. But under the court's decision in Nally II and 
Plaintiff's proposed theory, if the counselee will not see a 
psychotherapist voluntarily, the counselor must convey his 
concerns about the counselee to a psychotherapist, the mental 
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health authorities, or to the parishioner's family. It is not 
enough for a counseling pastor merely to encourage a potentially 
suicidal individual, as in Nally II, to see a licensed 
psychotherapist. This duty requiring the pastor to convey 
information about the parishioner to third parties, a duty that 
California courts have wisely chosen not to impose upon licensed 
therapists (See Bellah v. Greenson, 146 Cal. Rptr. at p. 539) 
makes it impossible for the pastor to assure the necessary 
degree of confidentiality and may, in turn, deter those with 
suicidal tendencies from seeking counseling at all. The state 
created breach of confidentiality required by Nally II could 
effectively destroy much pastoral counseling. 
The second burden on religion created by the rule 
articulated in Nally II is the threat of litigation. The costs 
of modern day litigation are prohibitive for most pastors. They 
are especially burdensome to volunteer pastors—like Mormon 
Bishops—whose professional interests lie elsewhere. But even 
more than the costs of litigation the specter of having to 
answer to a judge or jury for action taken or statements made 
during counseling would terrify even the most competent 
counsellor. That fear would have a tendency to discourage any 
counseling at all; at the very least, it would encourage the 
pastor to "water down" his message so as to reduce the 
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likelihood of offending the sensibilities of a future judge or 
jury. 
The chilling effect of potential litigation on the extent 
and content of pastoral counseling is likely to be particularly 
acute under a negligence standard. A negligence suit 
necessarily subjects pastors' exercise of judgment (as opposed 
to intentional conduct) to second guessing by judges and 
juries. The application of any negligence standard is 
inherently uncertain and imprecise, depending as it does upon a 
judge or jury's determination after the fact, of (a) the 
standard of care to which a reasonably prudent pastor would 
conform under similar circumstances, and (b) whether the pastor 
met that standard. This uncertainty creates a burden on 
religion analagous to that in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 305-07 (1940). 
Just as a licensing requirement giving wide discretion to 
the licensing officer in that case was found likely to "chill" 
the exercise of the right to engage in religious solicitation, 
so too the possibility that a pastor's decisions will be subject 
to review by judges and juries under an uncertain standard of 
conduct "chills" the right to engage in pastoral counseling. 
The third burden which the United States Supreme Court 
recognized as a significant burden on religion in Corporation of 
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (1987) is simply 
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the "fear of potential liability" (See Amos at p. 2868). The 
fear of liability under the theory created by Nally II is 
particularly well founded, since application of that theory will 
often amount to strict liability for suicide. As already noted, 
the duty imposed by the Court of Appeals is not merely the duty 
to refer a suicidal individual to a licensed psychotherapist, 
but a duty effectively to refer. 240 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The 
pastor, however, has no way to compel the counselee to see a 
licensed psychotherapist. If the counselee will not see a 
psychotherapist voluntarily, the only way a counselor can 
fulfill his or her "duty of effective referral" is to succeed in 
convincing a psychotherapist or the counselee1s relatives to 
initiate involuntary commitment proceedings on nothing but the 
strength of the counselor's description of the counsellee's 
behavior and statements. Jd. at 243-44. If the counselor does 
not succeed in that endeavor, he or she will likely face a 
lawsuit in which the only real question is whether the suicide 
was foreseeable to the counselor. See Id. at 226-27. But if a 
suicide has, in fact, taken place, there will almost always be 
some evidence from which a judge or jury can infer forseeability. 
The fourth burden on religion created by Nally II is a 
substantial intrusion into church autonomy. Any tort liability 
for religious activities by pastors necessarily creates 
governmental standards of conduct. These standards, in turn, 
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require religious institutions to change the ways they train 
their pastors, thereby interfering with the institutions 
constitutional right to regulate their own affairs and to be 
"independent from secular control or manipulation". Kedroff v. 
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). Several 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court have recognized 
that such interference constitutes a substantial, and in most 
instances, constitutionally unacceptable burden on religion. 
See Kedroff, supra, (interference in disputes over church 
government); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696 (1976) (same); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (interference with ecclesiastic control of 
church schools); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 
107 S.Ct. 2862 (interference with church employment policies). 
The particular liability theory created by Nally II, 
moreover, carries an unusual potential for intrusion into the 
autonomy of religious institutions. In order to avoid 
liability, churches must engage in suicide prevention training 
and must also sometimes commit suicidal people to institutions. 
And, as the trial judge stated: 
The court would by necessity . . . have to 
set standards of competence, standards of 
training of counselors, determine what may 
or may not be counsel, determine if the 
problems counselled were moral or mental and 
monitor the counseling for all time to come. 
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Fifth, the duties imposed by the court of appeal may be 
inconsistent with the religious beliefs of a particular 
institution or a particular pastor. In the Nally II case, for 
example, Defendant Thomson expressed strong, religiously-based 
opposition to psychological or psychiatric counseling under most 
circumstances. 240 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45 and n.6. And even if 
an individual pastor has no specific religious objection, he or 
she may nonetheless feel a religiously-based hesitance to refer 
a parishioner to a professional psychologist since, as the trial 
judge aptly put it, "clinical psychology and pastoral counseling 
do not spring from the same well". 
Finally, the mere existence of a legal duty compelling 
pastoral counselors (who comprise the vast majority of 
non-therapist counselors) to "refer" their seriously troubled 
counselees to secular counselors suggests a state preference for 
the latter over the former. It tells ordinary citizens that in 
the State's view people with serious emotional difficulties 
should be seeing secular counselors rather than religious ones. 
It thus represents an official, governmental judgment that 
secular counseling is more effective than religious counseling. 
Not only is that conclusion not supported by any evidence, it 
also presents substantial constitutional difficulties because it 
represents a governmental endorsement of the secular over the 
religious. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) 
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(O'Connor J. concurring) (government can infringe religious 
freedom by endorsing or disapproving religion); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-69 (1985) (O'Connor J. concurring in 
the judgment) (same). 
These burdens chill the exercise of religion in several 
different ways. As the dissenting judge in Nally II recognized, 
the majority's liability rule—including the duty effectively to 
refer--"can only have a chilling effect on the giving of 
counseling at all". 240 Cal. Rptr. at 243. That rule will not 
only discourage pastors from providing counseling it will also 
discourage suicidal individuals from seeking it and perhaps even 
more important, the court of appeals1 decision would "affect the 
way an organization carries out what it understands to be its 
religious mission", Amos/ supra, 107 S. Ct. at 2868, including 
the content of its religious counseling. 
VII. ALTHOUGH IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THERE EXISTED A GENUINE 
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER BISHOP BLACKBURN WAS GUILTY 
OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO PERSONALLY CONTACT 
MRS. WHITE BEFORE PROVIDING FUNDS FOR HER SON TO GO TO 
NORTH CAROLINA THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT 
REGARDING HER DAMAGES CONSISTING ONLY OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS, WHICH ARE NOT COMPENSABLE 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Mrs. White 
testified that she had suffered no out-of-pocket expenses or 
loss in connection with the incident complained of. The Church 
unit in North Carolina paid for Michael's transportation back to 
Utah, there were no tutoring costs, Michael graduated from high 
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school with some administrative help, there was no loss of 
income to the family as a result of Michael's absence, no money 
was sent to the families in North Carolina who hosted Michael 
and there were no medical bills paid as a result of the 
incident. Plaintiff expressed the full extent of her damages in 
Paragraph 19 of her Affidavit (R. 80): 
As a result of Bishop Blackburn 'helping' my 
son run away from home, I suffered terrible 
mental distress and emotional upheaval. 
As previously noted in this Brief, Bishop Blackburn's 
conduct does not meet the criteria required by this court to 
constitute the tort of "negligent infliction of emotional 
distress", and since no other damage was suffered by Plaintiff 
except the alleged "emotional distress", Plaintiff's theory of 
simple negligence can result in no recovery as a matter of law. 
VIII. PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE PER SE FAILS ON THE 
FACTS 
Plaintiff has not treated in her brief on appeal and, 
thus, may have abandoned her fifth cause of action for 
"negligence per se" which cause attempts to impose civil 
liability upon the Defendants for the alleged violation of 
78-3a-19, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, a section of the Juvenile 
Court Act prohibiting any person 18 years of age or over from 
encouraging "a child to leave the legal or physical custody of 
any person in which the child lawfully resides" and makes such 
conduct a Class B Misdemeanor. That cause of action fails on 
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the facts since Bishop Blackburn's conduct, as a matter of law, 
cannot be interpreted as "wrongful encouragement of a child to 
leave the legal or physical custody of any person". Since 
Bishop Blackburn thought he had a written consent from Michael's 
natural mother, he acted in good faith thinking he was 
performing a welfare service both for the boy and the mother who 
presumably could not afford the transportation costs. No civil 
liability should attach under the facts of this case because of 
the Bishop's good faith conduct. In its Memorandum Decision the 
District Court concluded that: 
Defendant Blackburn was not negligent per se 
for the reason that Defendant Blackburn did 
not wrongfully encourage Mr. Chandler to 
leave the custody of his mother. In fact, 
Defendant Blackburn's acts were to assist in 
reuniting the family at least temporarily. 
The court does not question that Defendant 
Blackburn's acts were done with good 
intentions and not for the purposes set 
forth in Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action." 
(R. 208). 
CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the Affidavits and Depositions, the 
District Court concluded that Plaintiff could not recover under 
any of her proposed theories of liability. This determination 
was correct in that, in the absence of other evidence, had this 
case come before a jury, the court would have correctly 
nonsuited Plaintiff at the conclusion of her case. In such 
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circumstances the granting of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was entirely proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Allen M. Swan ( 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
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